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NOTES
BREAKING NEW GROUND: USING EMINENT
DOMAIN FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Elizabeth F. Gallagher*
INTRODUCTION
The city of New London, Connecticut, has struggled for decades to
reverse its economic decline.1 At the turn of the nineteenth century,
New London was prosperous as a whaling town and flourished once
again during the Cold War because of defense industries in the area.2
However, after these industries declined, New London lost thousands
of jobs and became one of Connecticut's poorest cities. 3  The
waterfront area sits nearly vacant.4 As part of a revitalization effort,
the city persuaded the pharmaceutical company Pfizer to build a $270
million research and development facility,5 which opened in 2001.6
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2001, Yale
University. I would like to thank Professor Eduardo Pefialver, whose seminar and
helpful comments challenged me to think more deeply and broadly about the issues in
this Note.
1. See Terry Pristin, Connecticut Homeowners Say Eminent Domain Isn't a
Revenue-Raising Device, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 2004, at C8. New London is located
along the coast of Connecticut, where the Thames River meets the Long Island
Sound. See Jennie Green, Weekender: New London, Conn., N.Y. Times, May 31,
2002, at F8.
2. See Jane Ellen Dee, Oh, Claire: You're a Scholar and Visionary... If Only
You Could Quit Leaving Skin on the Sidewalk, Hartford Courant, Feb. 25, 2001,
Northeast Magazine, at 5.
3. See Carrie Budoff, A Battle Against Eminent Domain: Gritty Dispute in New
London, Hartford Courant, Jan. 1, 2001, at Al; Pristin, supra note 1. The city
recently lost approximately 1900 government positions, in addition to 1000 positions
lost when the United States Naval Undersea Warfare Center moved to Rhode Island
from New London in 1996. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 510 (Conn.
2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
4. See Santa Mendoza, Big Dreams Mean Big Land Problems, Conn. L. Trib.,
Dec. 30, 2002, at 24.
5. See Pristin, supra note 1.
6. See Robert A. Hamilton, New London Is Bustling After Pfizer Complex
Opens, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 2001, § 11, at 9. The new facility has spurred economic
growth in the area by creating jobs and demand for housing. See C.J. Hughes, Making
Over New London's Rough Port, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 2004, § 11, at 13; Richard
Lezin Jones, Through the Roof, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21,2004, § 14CN, at 1.
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New London has plans to rebuild a ninety-acre waterfront parcel
near the Pfizer buildings to further the city's rejuvenation.7 The
project will include housing, offices, and a waterfront hotel with a
fitness center and conference space.8 Since the plan was conceived in
1998,9 it has enjoyed the enthusiastic support of state and local
governments, ° in no small part due to the more than 1000 jobs and
$700,000 to $1.2 million in property tax revenues anticipated to result
from the project."
Despite these anticipated benefits, this redevelopment project has
been on hold for over four years because of seven property owners
who refuse to move. 2 On December 21, 2000, these property owners
brought suit against the City of New London to challenge the city's
use of eminent domain to assemble land for the waterfront
development project.13 In order for the city to take the plaintiffs' land
through eminent domain, the city must pay them at least market value
for their property and the taking must be for a public use. 4 The
plaintiffs claim that the city has no authority to take their land
because the land will not be put to public use, but will benefit private,
commercial interests.15
As cities struggle to provide jobs and services for their residents and
as land becomes more scarce, 16 controversies over economic
development projects such as the one described above have become
7. See Eleanor Charles, Eminent Domain Challenged in New London Project,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 2001, § 11, at 9.
8. See id.
9. See Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789,
at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002), affid in part and rev'd in part, 843 A.2d 500
(Conn.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
10. See Charles, supra note 7.
11. See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 510.
12. See id. at 510-11; Budoff, supra note 3; Pristin, supra note 1. The nearly ninety
other property owners have since settled with the city and moved. See Pristin, supra
note 1.
13. See Kelo, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *1; David M. Herszenhorn,
Residents of New London Go to Court, Saying Project Puts Profit Before Homes, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 21, 2000, at B5.
14. See U.S. Const. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."). Just compensation for the exercise of eminent
domain must constitute at least market value of the property taken. See, e.g., United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943). If the government uses eminent domain to
take property that is subject to a leasehold, the owner of the lease is entitled to
compensation for the value of the lost leasehold interest. See Alamo Land & Cattle
Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 303 (1976) (reiterating that the Fifth Amendment
requires compensation for unexpired leasehold interests terminated by the exercise of
eminent domain); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 381-82 (1945)
(holding that a warehouse tenant was entitled to compensation for the value of his
leasehold interest that the federal government condemned through eminent domain
for wartime use for one year).
15. See Herszenhorn, supra note 13.
16. See Richard B. Tranter, Defer to Legislatures, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 16, 2004, at 23.
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increasingly common. 7 In turn, property owners who stand to be
displaced by economic development projects have increasingly looked
to the courts to intervene. 18 For both the Connecticut Superior Court
and the Connecticut Supreme Court, the public benefit that the city of
New London stands to reap from this development project was clear. 9
Both courts ruled that New London's exercise of eminent domain was
constitutional.2" The plaintiffs then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, which has agreed to hear the case.2' Property owners
such as these plaintiffs should not be allowed to hold up economic
development for years in court when the legislature has made a
reasoned determination that the inconvenience suffered by the
property owners who are forced to sell is a justifiable cost in light of
the substantial benefit to the public that will result.
This Note examines whether the use of eminent domain to transfer
property from one private party to another for economic development
can satisfy the public use requirement of eminent domain. Part I
outlines the history of the use of eminent domain to transfer property
from one private party to another, especially for the purpose of
economic development. Part II describes the dominant approaches
that have been applied to argue for or against the use of eminent
domain for economic development. Finally, Part III explains why
economic development is a valid public use and why the political
process coupled with rational basis judicial review of legislative
determinations of public use are appropriate safeguards against
abuses of eminent domain and adequately protect individual
landowners' and the government's interests at stake.
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT
OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
This part describes the background and history of the public use
requirement of the Takings Clause. Part L.A introduces the public use
requirement. Part I.B discusses the Supreme Court's public use
decisions where eminent domain was used to transfer property from
17. See Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle over the Public Use Clause: Survey of
Holdings and Trends, 1986-2003, 39 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 251, 252 (2004)
(surveying federal and state public use decisions from 1987 to 2003).
18. See id. at 257-58.
19. See Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789,
at *128-30 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 843 A.2d
500, 542-43 (Conn.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
20. See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 562 (allowing the city's use of eminent domain to take
plaintiffs' property by affirming in part and reversing in part the Superior Court's
decision); Kelo, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *341 (allowing the city's use of
eminent domain for one parcel of land, but granting injunction to the plaintiffs with
respect to another parcel).
21. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 27.
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one private party to another, as well as lower court decisions where
eminent domain was used for economic development.
A. The Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
"private property [to] be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 2 This prohibition is known as the Takings Clause.23
States are constrained from such action through incorporation of the
Takings Clause into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.24 In addition, most state constitutions contain a similar
public use requirement.
The function of the public use requirement in the Takings Clause is
the subject of considerable debate.26 Textually, the words "public
use" seem to indicate that there are some types of takings, namely
takings for nonpublic use, that would be impermissible even if
compensated.2 7  Alternatively, the drafters of the Fifth Amendment
22. U.S. Const. amend. V.
23. See, e.g., Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the Original Understanding
of the So-Called "Takings" Clause, 53 Hastings L.J. 1245, 1248 (2002) (describing the
drafting of the Fifth Amendment, including the Takings Clause).
24. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231, 244 (1984) (analyzing
exercises of eminent domain by the State of Hawaii under the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment); Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241
(1897) (incorporating the Takings Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause, and thus making the Takings Clause applicable to state governments).
25. See Robert C. Ellickson & Vicki L. Been, Land Use Controls 1011 (2d ed.
2000); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 61, 67
n.24 (1986) (describing takings clauses in state constitutions). For example, under the
Arizona Constitution,
[p]rivate property shall not be taken for private use, except for private ways
of necessity, and for drains, flumes, or ditches, on or across the lands of
others for mining, agricultural, domestic, or sanitary purposes. No private
property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just
compensation having first been made ....
Ariz. Const. art. II, § 17. In Connecticut, "[tjhe private property of no person shall be
taken for public use, without just compensation therefor." Conn. Const. art. I, § 11.
The Michigan Constitution states that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation." Mich. Const. art. X, § 2. New Jersey's Constitution
states that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Individuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take
private property for public use without just compensation first made to the owners."
N.J. Const. art. I, 20.
26. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 23, at 1246 (describing the debate over the
scope of the public use requirement as well as over courts' authority to review
legislative determinations of public use).
27. See, e.g., Camarin Madigan, Taking for Any Purpose?, 9 Hastings W.-Nw. J.
Envtl. L. & Pol'y 179, 192 (2003) ("Why would [James] Madison, [the drafter of the
Fifth Amendment], have included the public use provision, if the Takings Clause
requires only basic due process guarantees?"); Jennifer J. Kruckeberg, Note, Can
Government Buy Everything?: The Takings Clause and the Erosion of the "Public
Use" Requirement, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 543, 566 (2002) ("[T]he inclusion of the words
'public use' in the Takings Clause had to mean something.").
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may have employed the words "public use" to denote when
compensation is required, rather than when the exercise of eminent
domain is permissible.28 Although there is no legislative history from
the drafting of the Fifth Amendment,29 early case law suggests that, at
that time, courts would have considered the use of eminent domain to
transfer property from one private party to another to be a private
use, which would not satisfy the public use requirement." Courts
since then have long interpreted the public use requirement as a
limitation, of varying stringency, on the government's exercise of
eminent domain.31
B. Courts' Treatment of the Public Use Requirement in Cases Where
Eminent Domain Is Used to Transfer Property from One Private Party
to Another
Although all courts interpret the public use requirement as some
sort of limitation on the government's exercise of eminent domain,32
only one state, South Carolina, requires property taken through
eminent domain literally to be used or occupied by the public to
satisfy the public use requirement.33 In other states and under the
28. See Harrington, supra note 23, at 1249, 1299 (arguing that the words "public
use" were originally intended to be "descriptive, rather than prescriptive"); Merrill,
supra note 25, at 71 ("[Public use] could mean, as traditionally thought, that
government may condemn only if the use is public. But it could also mean that when
government condemns, it must compensate only if the taking is for a public use.");
William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 553,
591 (1972) (stating that the words "public use" are grammatically descriptive rather
than limiting, although acknowledging that the words generally have not been
interpreted that way); infra text accompanying notes 168-69.
29. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 791 (1995) (exploring the
historical understanding of the Takings Clause as a protection against physical takings
rather than regulations affecting value).
30. In Calder v. Bull, although not a case implicating the Takings Clause, Justice
Chase stated that "Jilt is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a
Legislature with [the power to take property from A and give it to B] ... and,
therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it." Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (seriatim opinion); see also Laura Mansnerus, Note, Public Use,
Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 409, 412-13
(1983).
31. See Harrington, supra note 23, at 1254-55; infra notes 105-06 and
accompanying text.
32. See Harrington, supra note 23, at 1254-55.
33. See Karesh v. City Council, 247 S.E.2d 342, 345 (S.C. 1978) (holding that the
public must have definite and fixed use of the property in order to satisfy the public
use requirement of the South Carolina Constitution, so the use of eminent domain to
build a convention center and hotel complex was unconstitutional); Merrill, supra
note 25, at 68 n.26 (pointing out that South Carolina is the only state that has refused
to interpret "public use" more broadly to include public benefit or advantage); Steven
M. Crafton, Comment, Taking the Oakland Raiders: A Theoretical Reconsideration of
the Concepts of Public Use and Just Compensation, 32 Emory L.J. 857, 879 n.125
(1983) (noting that out of three jurisdictions that have held the use of eminent domain
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Federal Constitution, public use is interpreted more broadly to
include situations where the public benefits from the land, but may
not literally use or occupy it.34 Furthermore, public use does not
necessarily mean public, or government, ownership; 35 private
ownership resulting from eminent domain can constitute a valid public
use.36 The Supreme Court has approved of two circumstances when
eminent domain that ultimately results in private ownership of the
seized land satisfies the public use requirement-blight clearance and
remedying a skewed housing market. 37 The Court will soon decide
whether a third circumstance, economic development, can satisfy the
public use requirement.38 Courts that have already considered the
issue differ on whether the public use requirement is satisfied when
eminent domain is used to transfer property from one private party to
another for economic development. 9
Part I.B.1 summarizes the Supreme Court's two public use decisions
where eminent domain was used to transfer property from one private
party to another. Part I.B.2 discusses lower court decisions on
whether economic development is a valid public use to sustain the
transfer of property from one private party to another through
eminent domain.
1. The Supreme Court's Public Use Decisions
Although the Supreme Court has not yet considered whether
economic development justifies the use of eminent domain,4" the
Court has allowed the use of eminent domain to transfer property
from one private party to another in two cases, Berman v. Parker"1
and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.12  Both were short,
for urban renewal to be unconstitutional under a literal public use test, only South
Carolina still adheres to this test).
34. See 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 7.02[3] (Julius L. Sackman ed., 3d ed.
2004) [hereinafter Nichols]; infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
35. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954) ("[Plublic ownership is [not] the
sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment
projects.").
36. See id. at 33-34.
37. See infra Part I.B.1.
38. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to consider this question. See Kelo
v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004). The question presented in Kelo is the
following: "What protection does the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement
provide for individuals whose property is being condemned, not to eliminate slums or
blight, but for the sole purpose of 'economic development' that will perhaps increase
tax revenues and improve the local economy?" Brief of Amici Curiae America's
Future Inc. and Somerset Transmission and Repair Center at i, Kelo v. City of New
London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004) (No. 04-108).
39. See infra Parts I.B.2.a-b.
40. See supra note 38.
41. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
42. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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unanimous opinions characterized by strong deference to legislative
determinations of public use.43
In Berman, Congress sought to remedy "substandard housing and
blighted areas" in the District of Columbia by allowing the District of
Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency (the "Agency") to acquire
land by eminent domain for redevelopment." Congress has the same
legislative power over the District of Columbia as state legislatures
have over state affairs.45 The Agency sought to acquire the plaintiff's
land as part of its redevelopment of the larger area where the
plaintiff's parcel was located.46  Under the Agency's plan, the
plaintiff's parcel would likely have been sold to a private developer. 7
The plaintiff challenged the condemnation as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment's public use requirement because the property was not
itself substandard housing or a slum, and the property would be
redeveloped by a private developer into homes for private use. 8
The Supreme Court disagreed and allowed the use of eminent
domain to transfer property from one private party to another for the
purpose of blight clearance. 49 The Court declined to second-guess the
legislature's determination that the use of eminent domain was
necessary for the elimination of slums from the area, finding that
"[t]he role of the judiciary in determining whether [eminent domain]
power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow
one.950 The Court then went on to hold that "[o]nce the object is
within the authority of Congress, the means by which it will be
attained is also for Congress to determine. '"" Thus, the Court
accepted the legislature's determination of whether the purpose
satisfied the public use requirement and whether the method of
obtaining that purpose was valid.52
The Supreme Court's most recent decision regarding the
constitutionality of transferring property from one private owner to
43. See id. at 241 (Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case); Berman, 348 U.S. at 32-33.
44. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28-29. Local governments that have eminent domain
powers have been granted these powers by the legislature, usually through nonprofit
development corporations. See, e.g., id. at 29; Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d
500, 513-14 (Conn.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
45. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 31-32 (citing District of Columbia v. Thompson Co.,
346 U.S. 100, 108 (1953)).
46. See id. at 30-31.
47. See id. at 30. Congress's act allowed the Agency to lease or sell some of the
property it acquired to private companies, provided that those companies agreed to
use the land in accordance with the Agency's redevelopment plan. Id. In fact,
"[p]reference [was] to be given to private enterprise over public agencies in executing
the redevelopment plan." Id.
48. See id. at 31.
49. See id. at 36.
50. Id. at 32.
51. Id. at 33.
52. See id. at 32-33.
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another through eminent domain was in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff.53  In Midkiff, landowners challenged the Hawaii state
legislature's plan to use eminent domain to redistribute land from
lessors to lessees claiming that it failed to satisfy the public use
requirement of the Takings Clause of the Federal Constitution.54 The
legislature's purpose in enacting this plan was to alleviate the
unusually skewed residential land market caused by the concentration
of a majority of the land in the hands of very few owners. 5 The
legislature enacted a complicated condemnation plan that balanced
this economic purpose with the landowners' claims that they were
prevented from selling their land by the "significant federal tax
liabilities they would incur."56 The plan provided for purchase only by
groups of eligible tenants, 7 for a public hearing to determine whether
''acquisition. . . of the tract will 'effectuate the public purposes' of the
Act,"5" and for negotiations between lessors and lessees to set an
adequate price for the owner's land, not to fall below fair market
value.59
The Supreme Court held that the Hawaii legislature's plan to use
eminent domain to remedy the land oligopoly satisfied the public use
requirement of the Takings Clause.' The Court refused to "substitute
its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a
public use 'unless the use be palpably without reasonable
foundation.' 61 The Court reasoned that "[r]egulating oligopoly and
the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State's police
powers"" and that the public use requirement is "coterminous with
the scope of a sovereign's police powers. '"63 Therefore, the public use
requirement was satisfied in this case.' The Court also found that the
state's plan was a rational means through which to relieve the land
ownership problem. Thus, the Supreme Court again showed great
53. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
54. See id. at 234-35.
55. See id. at 233. The State of Hawaii discovered in the mid-1960s that about
ninety-two percent of the land not owned by the state or federal government
(approximately fifty-one percent of the land in Hawaii) was owned by only seventy-
two private landowners. See id. at 232. Therefore, most Hawaii residents leased land
from these landowners with no opportunity to buy. See id. at 232-33.
56. Id. at 233.
57. See id. The Hawaii Legislature defined "[a]n eligible tenant [as] one who,
among other things, owns a house on the lot, has a bona fide intent to live on the lot
or be a resident of the State, shows proof of ability to pay for a fee interest in it, and
does not own residential land elsewhere nearby." Id. at 233 n.1 (citation omitted).
58. Id. at 233.
59. See id. at 234 & n.2.
60. See id. at 241.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 242.
63. Id. at 240.
64. See id. at 243.
65. See id. at 242.
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deference to a legislature's determination of public use and its choice
of how to effectuate its chosen purpose.66
2. Lower Courts' Conflicting Interpretations of Public Use
Despite the Supreme Court's consistent deference to legislative
determinations of public use, not all lower courts have taken a
similarly deferential approach.67 In general, federal courts are more
deferential to legislative determinations of public use than state
courts,68 where most public use cases are litigated.69 In a study of
appellate level public use cases decided between 1954, the year the
Supreme Court decided Berman v. Parker," and 1986, all seventeen
federal cases surveyed upheld the use of eminent domain, while only
about eighty-four percent of the 291 state public use decisions held
that the public use requirement was satisfied.71 A more recent survey
of 236 public use decisions from 1986 to 2003 revealed that these
results remain largely unchanged.72
Within public use cases, one category of public use decisions that is
particularly divisive involves economic development.73 Courts differ
on whether the use of eminent domain to transfer property from one
private owner to another for economic development of the
community satisfies the public use requirement.74
a. Decisions that Have Found Economic Development to Satisfy the
Public Use Requirement
Perhaps the most famous state case that allowed economic
development to satisfy the public use requirement, and consequently
66. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
67. See infra Parts I.B.2.a-b.
68. See Merrill, supra note 25, at 65, 94-95 (surveying public use cases from 1954
to 1986).
69. See id. at 95; Wilk, supra note 17, at 257.
70. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
71. See Merrill, supra note 25, at 96.
72. See Wilk, supra note 17, at 257, 258. Of fourteen federal appellate public use
cases surveyed, only one invalidated the use of eminent domain because it did not
satisfy the public use requirement. See Daniels v. Area Plan Comm'n of Allen
County. 306 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that the county's vacation of a restrictive
covenant prohibiting anything other than single-family residential homes on the lots
in the plaintiff's residential subdivision, and the rezoning of the lots to allow for
commercial uses, violated the public use requirement of the Takings Clause of the
United States Constitution); Wilk, supra note 17, at 260. In contrast, of the remaining
222 state public use cases, eighteen percent found that the public use requirement was
not satisfied. See id. at 258. In both studies, over sixty percent of the public use cases
involved the assembly of large parcels of land for development projects. See Merrill,
supra note 25, at 98; Wilk, supra note 17, at 262.
73. See, e.g., infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
74. See infra Parts I.B.2.a-b.
184520051
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garnered much criticism, 75 was the Michigan Supreme Court's decision
in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit.76 In Poletown,
General Motors Corporation was searching for a site for a new
assembly plant. 7  Knowing that the City of Detroit was eager to keep
the company from moving out of the city, 78 General Motors requested
that the city help it acquire the desired parcel of land by condemning
it through eminent domain and then transferring the property to the
corporation.79 When the city complied, the neighborhood association
and individual landowners sued the city, claiming that the use of
eminent domain violated the public use requirement of the takings
clause of the Michigan Constitution. 0 The city argued that the new
General Motors plant would serve a public purpose by "alleviating
unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of the
community."'" When General Motors proposed the development
project, unemployment in the city was at eighteen percent overall and
thirty percent among black citizens.82 Even the dissent admitted that
it was "difficult to overstate the magnitude of the crisis."83  The
plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that even if this were true, the use
of eminent domain primarily benefited General Motors' profits and
thus could not constitute a public use.84
The Michigan Supreme Court held that the city's use of eminent
domain was permissible under the Michigan Constitution.85 The court
acknowledged that General Motors would benefit in a private
capacity from the taking, and such private benefit required heightened
judicial scrutiny of the city's claim of public benefit.86 But at the same
75. See, e.g., Crafton, supra note 33, at 883 (criticizing the use of eminent domain
in Poletown as for a private use, not a public use, and proposing a new definition of
public use based on the economic theory of public goods); Stephen J. Jones, Note,
Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny Analysis Under the
Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 Syracuse L. Rev. 285, 312-13
(2000) (arguing for strict scrutiny of public use cases such as Poletown); Mansnerus,
supra note 30, at 418-21 (describing the court's deference to the legislative public use
determination in Poletown as unprecedented).
76. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (per curiam), overruled by County of Wayne v.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
77. See id. at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 82-83. The city had long relied on the
automobile industry as its primary economic support. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 467
(Ryan, J., dissenting).
79. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 468 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 457; supra note 25 (quoting the text of the takings clause of the
Michigan Constitution).
81. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459. The city estimated that the new assembly plant
would result in the retention of 6150 jobs and generate $15 million in new property
tax revenues. Id. at 467 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
82. See id. at 465.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 458.
85. See id. at 460.
86. See id. at 459-60.
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time, the court, drawing support from Berman v. Parker,87 recognized
that after "[t]he Legislature has determined that governmental action
of the type contemplated here meets a public need and serves an
essential public purpose, [t]he Court's role ... is limited."88 Upon the
evidence, the court was satisfied that the public benefit of the project
was "clear and significant" and that such a project was "a legitimate
object of the Legislature."89
Beginning with Justices Fitzgerald's and Ryan's dissents in
Poletown, many commentators criticized the decision as rendering the
public use requirement meaningless.9" Nonetheless, the Poletown
decision stood in Michigan for over twenty years.9'
In Kelo v. City of New London, New London wanted to use
eminent domain to take the plaintiffs' waterfront properties to build,
among other things, an industrial park and a hotel.92 The city
projected that the project would directly and indirectly create over
1000 jobs and generate property tax revenues of $700,000 to $1.2
million.93 The city had recently lost thousands of jobs94 and the state
had designated the area as a "distressed municipality."95 The plaintiffs
challenged the taking under both the United States and Connecticut
Constitutions as invalid because the transfer of their property to a
private party would not be for blight clearance or to provide a public
service or utility.96
87. 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see supra text accompanying notes 44-52.
88. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 458.
89. Id. at 459.
90. See id. at 464 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting); id. at 464-65 (Ryan, J., dissenting);
supra note 75 and accompanying text. However, even after Poletown, not all transfers
of property from one private party to another through eminent domain in Michigan
were found to satisfy the public use requirement. In City of Center Line v. Chmelko,
the city claimed that its exercise of eminent domain would alleviate a parking
problem that did not really exist. 416 N.W.2d 401, 403-04 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). The
court relied on Poletown's requirement of a "clear and significant" public benefit and
held that the city's purported public benefit that required the exercise of eminent
domain was, in contrast, a "complete fiction." Id. at 402, 404. Similarly, in City of
Lansing v. Edward Rose Realty, Inc., the Michigan Supreme Court invalidated the
city's use of eminent domain to require the plaintiff, the owner of an apartment
complex, to allow access to the cable company with which the city had an exclusive
franchise agreement. 502 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Mich. 1993). Although the court
"assume[d] the validity of the public interest advanced by the city," it found that that
public interest was greatly outweighed by the private interest and therefore did not
satisfy the Michigan Constitution's public use requirement. Id. at 643.
91. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004)
(overruling Poletown); infra text accompanying notes 124-31.
92. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 509-11 (Conn.), cert. granted, 125
S. Ct. 27 (2004); supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
93. See supra text accompanying note 11.
94. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
95. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 510.
96. See id. at 519-20.
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The Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld the taking as
constitutional under both the United States and Connecticut
Constitutions.97 The court explained that the public use determination
"requires a degree of elasticity to be capable of meeting new
conditions and improvements and the ever increasing necessities of
society." 98  Moreover, the court recognized that deference to
legislative purposes and motives was consistent with previous
Connecticut cases,9 9 as well as Poletown,'0° Berman,0 1 and Midkiff. 2
The court concluded that the "significant municipal economic
development" that the plan would stimulate was a valid public use."0 3
Therefore, the court ruled that New London could use eminent
domain for economic development."
Many other state courts, including those in Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, and Ohio, have adopted a similarly deferential standard of
review for legislative determinations of the public use requirement
and allowed eminent domain to be used for economic development.05
97. See id. at 574.
98. Id. at 523.
99. See id. ("The term 'public use' is synonymous with public benefit or
advantage."(quoting Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, 550 (1866))).
100. See id. at 528 n.39; supra text accompanying notes 75-89.
101. See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 525-26; supra text accompanying notes 44-52.
102. See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 526-28; supra text accompanying notes 53-66.
103. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 528.
104. See id. at 536.
105. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors v. Bd. of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 66 P.3d 873,
883 (Kan. 2003) (holding that the development of an industrial park that would create
jobs and tax revenues fits within the valid public purpose of encouraging economic
development, so the county's exercise of eminent domain was permissible); City of
Shreveport v. Chanse Gas Corp., 794 So. 2d 962, 973 (La. Ct. App. 2001), writ denied,
805 So. 2d 209 (La. 2002) (holding that the city was permitted under the Louisiana
Constitution to acquire defendant property owners' land to build a state-of-the-art
convention center and hotel for the public purpose of economic development); Prince
George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 339 A.2d 278, 288-89 (Md. 1975)
(holding that the county could use eminent domain to assemble land for an industrial
park where the legislature had determined a need for such economic development
and the county would retain some control over the project); City of Duluth v. State,
390 N.W.2d 757, 761-64 (Minn. 1986) (finding that the public benefits of alleviating
unemployment and urban revitalization justified the state's use of eminent domain to
take property from the plaintiffs to give to another private party for use as a paper
mill); City of Kansas City v. Hon, 972 S.W.2d 407, 414-15 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
(allowing the city to condemn property through eminent domain for future
commercial expansion of an airport because such a use was a valid public use under
the Missouri Constitution); N.J. Hous. & Mortgage Fin. Agency v. Moses, 521 A.2d
1307, 1311-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (holding that the agency's use of
eminent domain to acquire land for a shopping center to support nearby housing
projects was for a valid public purpose under the United States and New Jersey
Constitutions); Vitucci v. New York City Sch. Constr. Auth., 735 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562
(App. Div. 2001) (holding that the city's use of eminent domain to condemn land for
urban renewal in the form of expansion of a major area employer's plant was valid);
City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365, 374-75 (N.D. 1996)
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b. Decisions that Have Not Found Economic Development to Satisfy
the Public Use Requirement
Currently, state courts, including those in Arkansas, Florida,
Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Washington,
do not view economic development as a valid public use for the
exercise of eminent domain."°6  In addition, property owners
challenging the use of eminent domain for economic development
have enjoyed some recent successes in courts that are usually
deferential to legislative determinations of public use1 7 and in at least
one court that had not yet decided the issue."8
(holding that the city had the power to exercise eminent domain for economic
development under the United States and North Dakota Constitutions and
remanding for determination whether the taking to build a retail food store was
primarily for a public, not private, purpose); City of Toledo v. Kim's Auto & Truck
Serv., Inc., No. L-02-1318, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 4995, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct.
17, 2003) (finding that, under Ohio's broad view of public use as any use of the land
from which the public benefits, the use of eminent domain to condemn a car repair
shop as part of an urban renewal plan was valid).
106. See City of Little Rock v. Raines, 411 S.W.2d 486, 494-95 (Ark. 1967) (holding
that the city did not have the power to use eminent domain to build an industrial park
because industrial development does not satisfy the public use requirement of the
Arkansas Constitution); Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451, 456-58
(Fla. 1975) (holding that the city could not condemn land through eminent domain to
build a parking lot below a privately owned shopping mall because the basis for the
need was private interest, not public necessity); City of Owensboro v. McCormick,
581 S.W.2d 3, 5-8 (Ky. 1979) (holding that the city could not take agricultural
property for the purpose of private commercial development because the purpose did
not satisfy the public use requirement of the Kentucky Constitution); Opinion of the
Justices, 131 A.2d 904, 908 (Me. 1957) (answering in the negative the legislature's
question whether a statute allowing the City of Bangor to use eminent domain for
industrial development would be constitutional under the Maine Constitution);
Merrill v. City of Manchester, 499 A.2d 216, 218-19 (N.H. 1985) (holding the public
use requirement of the New Hampshire Constitution was not satisfied where the city
sought to use eminent domain to develop land into an industrial park because such a
use would only incidentally benefit the public); Karesh v. City Council, 247 S.E.2d
342, 345 (S.C. 1978) (finding that the city could not use eminent domain under the
South Carolina Constitution to lease land to a private corporation for parking and
convention space because the project primarily benefited the private owner with no
assurance that the public would enjoy use of the facilities); In re Seattle, 638 P.2d 549,
556-59 (Wash. 1981) (en banc) (holding that the city's proposed plan to use eminent
domain to acquire land to rebuild the downtown area into a public space, shopping
center, art museum, and parking lot was unconstitutional under the Washington
Constitution because when only a portion of the project would be put to truly public
use, the public use requirement was not satisfied).
107. See, e.g., Daniels v. Area Plan Comm'n of Allen County, 306 F.3d 445, 465-66
(7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the public use requirement was not met where the state
had not determined what the property would be used for or whether the development
would certainly benefit the community); Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress
Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1229-30 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (granting
preliminary injunction to plaintiffs facing eminent domain in part because the public
use advanced by the city seemed pretextual where the city had shopped for a
developer before it had a plan for the land and where there was a nearby parcel
available for Costco, the developer that the city eventually recruited, to purchase for a
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Although New Jersey courts allow economic development to satisfy
the public use requirement, °9 in Casino Reinvestment Development
Authority v. Banin, the plaintiffs succeeded in arguing that the
development project for which their property was being condemned
did not serve a public purpose." Donald Trump had assembled a
parcel of land on which he intended to build a casino and hotel.111 He
asked the Casino Reinvestment Development Authority, which had
eminent domain powers,' to help him acquire three properties that
retail store); 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp.
2d 1123, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding, despite usual deference to legislative
determinations of public use, that the public use advanced, the need to satisfy the
expansion plans of a major employer who had other expansion options, was invalid
under the United States Constitution); Southwestern Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City
Envtl. L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 10-11 (Ill. 2002) (holding that the economic development
resulting incidentally from the state's use of eminent domain to condemn land for a
privately owned racetrack to build a parking garage violated the state constitution's
and the Federal Constitution's public use requirements because the private owner was
the primary beneficiary, not the public); Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin,
727 A.2d 102, 111 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998) (holding that, despite usual
deference to the state authority's determination of public use, the project to build a
parking lot for a casino did not satisfy the public use requirement because the purpose
of the taking was not clear at the time the state sought to condemn the property and
the private benefit overwhelmed the public benefit); infra text accompanying notes
109-15.
108. See, e.g., Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898, 904 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that
the city may not use eminent domain to give the plaintiff's property to a private
development corporation for redevelopment of the downtown area because the
ultimate use would not have been a valid public use under the Arizona Constitution);
infra text accompanying notes 116-23; see also Wilk, supra note 17, at 258 (finding an
increase during 2000-2003 in the number of cases where the purported public use for
the exercise of eminent domain was invalidated); Eduardo M. Pefialver, Perspective:
Public Use and Private Profit, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 29, 2004, at 2 ("Recently... some courts
have shown an increased willingness to second-guess the government's assertions that
it is condemning property for a public use."). These recent successful challenges to
the use of eminent domain for economic development likely motivated the plaintiffs
in Kelo to appeal their case to the Supreme Court, even though Connecticut is
generally deferential to legislative determinations of public use. See Kelo, 843 A.2d at
524-25. In fact, the homeowners in Kelo are represented by attorneys from the
Institute for Justice, which successfully represented other homeowners in recent
eminent domain cases, including Banin, 727 A.2d at 103, and Bailey, 76 P.3d at 899.
See Scott Bullock, Narrow "Public Use," Nat'l L.J., Aug. 16, 2004, at 23. The Institute
for Justice also filed an amicus brief on behalf of the plaintiffs who prevailed in
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004), which overruled
Poletown. See Bullock, supra. The Institute for Justice is a public interest law firm
devoted to advancing and defending freedom by representing clients in cases
involving economic liberty, private property rights, and the First Amendment, among
other issues. See Inst. for Justice, About IJ, at http://www.ij.org/profile/index.html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
109. See, e.g., N.J. Hous. & Mortgage Fin. Agency v. Moses, 521 A.2d 1307, 1311
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (holding that the agency's use of eminent domain to
acquire land for a shopping center to support nearby housing projects was for a valid
public purpose under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions).
110. Banin, 727 A.2d at 111.
111. See id. at 106.
112. See id. at 103.
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he had been unable to purchase in order to build an adjacent parking
lot and park."3 In response to the property owners' challenge, the
court found that the exercise of eminent domain was impermissible
because there was no definite plan as to the proposed use of the
land" 4 and the private benefit to Trump would overwhelm the public
benefit."1 5
Bailey v. Myers"6 was the first public use decision to reach an
appellate court in Arizona in seventeen years" 7 and the first time the
court addressed whether economic development satisfied the public
use requirement of the Arizona Constitution."8 The City of Mesa,
Arizona, wanted to use eminent domain to take the plaintiffs'
business, Bailey's Brake Service, to redevelop a larger, five-acre plot
of land into a retail center."9 Under the redevelopment project, the
site of Bailey's Brake Service was to hold an Ace Hardware store. 20
The plaintiffs claimed that their property was being taken for private
use rather than public use required by the Arizona Constitution.'
The court agreed, stating that when private ownership results from the
exercise of eminent domain, the public benefit must be substantially
greater than the private benefit. 22 Since the city's use of eminent
domain did not meet this requirement, the condemnation could not go
forward.'23
Yet another recent victory for individual property owners against
an exercise of eminent domain for economic development occurred in
Michigan. On July 31, 2004, the Michigan Supreme Court again had
occasion to address the use of eminent domain for economic
development, in County of Wayne v. Hathcock.124 In Hathcock, the
county sought to develop an area of land near an airport into a "state-
of-the-art business and technology park" through use of its eminent
domain powers. 125 The plaintiffs, whose land was to be condemned
for the new development, challenged the taking, claiming it failed to
satisfy the public use requirement of the Michigan Constitution. 26
113. See id. at 106.
114. Trump would have been permitted to use the land for anything that was part
of the "hotel development project and appurtenant facilities." Id. at 110.
115. See id. at 111.
116. 76 P.3d 898 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
117. See Wilk, supra note 17, at 258.
118. See Bailey, 76 P.3d at 900; supra note 25 (quoting the takings clause of the
Arizona Constitution).
119. See Bailey, 76 P.3d at 899-900.
120. See id. at 899.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 904.
123. See id.
124. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
125. Id. at 770.




This time, the court undertook a much more searching review of the
purported public use that would result from the private economic
development and rejected the court's deference to the legislature in
Poletown as unsupported and "disingenuous."'' 27  Instead, to
determine whether the project satisfied the public use requirement,
the court in Hathcock emphasized the "common understanding of
[public use] among those sophisticated in the law at ratification" of
the state constitution. 128  The court identified only three situations
where the common understanding at the time of the constitution's
ratification would allow the transfer of condemned property to a
private entity to constitute a public use: (1) when the transfer is of
extreme public necessity, as when a railroad must be built; (2) when
the public retains some sort of control over the use of the property, as
where a privately owned utility pipe is controlled by the state; and (3)
when land to be condemned is selected because of public concern, as
in blight clearance.19 Since the proposed technology park did not fall
within any of these categories, the court held that the transfer of land
to a private entity did not satisfy the public use requirement of
eminent domain. 3 ' In doing so, the court overruled Poletown.1
31
Thus, courts are currently conflicted over whether economic
development can constitute a public use sufficient to justify the use of
eminent domain. 132  Even courts that have held economic
development to be a valid public use do not always approve every
exercise of eminent domain for economic development.3 3 In addition,
courts that agree on whether economic development satisfies the
public use requirement can differ in their justifications for their
decisions.'34 This Note next discusses various approaches to whether
economic development satisfies or does not satisfy the public use
requirement.
127. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 785 n.81.
128. Id. at 787. The Michigan Constitution was ratified in 1963. Id. at 781.
129. See id. at 781-83.
130. See id. at 784.
131. See id. at 787; supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text (discussing Poletown).
132. See supra notes 67-131 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 90; supra note 107 and accompanying text; text accompanying
notes 109-15.
134. Compare, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 116-23 (considering whether the
public use requirement is met by balancing the public benefits against the private
benefits), with supra text accompanying notes 124-31 (considering whether the public




II. COMPETING VIEWS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS A VALID
OR INVALID PUBLIC USE FOR THE EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Judicial interpretations of the public use requirement can be
categorized by their outcomes as either narrow or broad.'35 The
narrow interpretation, with very few exceptions, limits public use to
situations where the public owns the property or has significant access
to the property. 36  Under the narrow interpretation, economic
development does not satisfy the public use requirement. The broad
interpretation equates public use with public benefit or advantage'37
and thus may consider the use of eminent domain to transfer property
to a private party for economic development to satisfy the public use
requirement. 3 8 Even within these two categories, however, courts
and commentators have used a variety of approaches to argue for the
same outcome. This part discusses the various approaches that courts
and scholars use to justify a broad or narrow interpretation of the
public use requirement as it pertains to economic development.'3 9
A. The Broad Interpretation: Economic Development Satisfies the
Public Use Requirement
Part II.A summarizes the major arguments put forth by courts and
scholars to allow the use of eminent domain for economic
development.
135. See 2A Nichols, supra note 34, § 7.02[2]-[7].
136. See 2A id. § 7.02[2]; Mansnerus, supra note 30, at 421-22. For example, the
court in Hathcock supported a narrow interpretation of the public use requirement.
See supra text accompanying notes 129-30; see also cases cited supra note 106.
137. See 2A Nichols, supra note 34, § 7.02[3]; Mansnerus, supra note 30, at 413, 421-
22. The Berman, Midkiff, Poletown, and Kelo decisions are examples of a broad
approach. See supra text accompanying notes 44-65, 75-89, 92-104; see also cases cited
supra note 105.
138. Almost all states now define "public use" more broadly than literal use by the
public. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34. As a consequence, the description
"narrow approach" is now often used to denote an approach to the public use
requirement that is generally restrictive and less deferential to legislative public use
determinations, but that is not strictly limited to use by the public. See Kelo v. City of
New London, 843 A.2d 500, 532 (Conn.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004); see, e.g.,
supra note 106 and accompanying text (citing cases in which courts have taken a
narrow approach to the public use requirement, in the more current use of "narrow,"
and not allowed economic development as a valid public use). Thus, courts that take
a broad approach to the public use requirement as it is traditionally defined, see supra
text accompanying note 137, may or may not find economic development to satisfy
the public use requirement. In references to broad or narrow approaches to the use
of eminent domain for economic development in the remainder of this Note, the
broad approach would typically allow economic development to satisfy the public use
requirement and a narrow approach typically would not.
139. See infra Parts II.A-B.
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1. The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development Is
Necessary for Land Development
The main argument that the public use requirement should be
interpreted broadly is that such a power is necessary to support
beneficial land development.1 41 When a developer seeks to acquire
land for a new project, owners, knowing their land is necessary to the
project, have an incentive to hold out for a higher selling price than
fair market value. 141 Holdout landowners can greatly increase the
price of acquiring land for development projects, or may impede the
project altogether, if the owner refuses to sell under any
circumstances.1 42  Since the most common public use controversy
involves the assembly of large parcels of land for development
projects,'143 holdout landowners can be a significant impediment to
land development. Thus, the use of eminent domain for economic
development to acquire the holdout properties may be the only way to
allow development projects to continue.' 44
2. Economic Development Projects Bring Benefits to the
Surrounding Communities
Courts that have held economic development to satisfy the public
use requirement have noted the benefits to the community that these
projects bring.145 In particular, the increase in jobs and tax revenues
that result from these projects are often greatly needed for the
revitalization of the community. 46 Economic development projects
140. See, e.g., Tranter, supra note 16 (arguing that narrowing the permissible uses
of eminent domain will ultimately hinder redevelopment efforts and "contribute to
urban decline").
141. See Merrill, supra note 25, at 75.
142. See id.
143. See supra note 72.
144. Elizabeth A. Taylor, Note, The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative and the
Power of Eminent Domain, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 1061, 1083-84 (1995) (supporting the use
of eminent domain for urban redevelopment as a valid public use but advocating a
stricter public use test when private corporations exercise eminent domain power).
But cf. Merrill, supra note 25, at 82 (noting that one common objection to the use of
eminent domain to assemble large tracts of land is that developers may use buying
agents, option agreements, and straw transactions to complete a transaction, making
the use of eminent domain unnecessary). In a straw transaction or purchase, property
is bought by a temporary, third-party owner and subsequently transferred to the real
purchaser. See Black's Law Dictionary 1461 (8th ed. 2004). In addition, a developer
wishing to remain anonymous can authorize a buying agent to purchase property on
his behalf without disclosing his identity to the seller. See id. at 67 (defining agency
and undisclosed agency).
145. See supra notes 81-83, 89, 92-95, 103 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 81, 88-89, 93 and accompanying text; see also Joseph William
Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 611, 737-38 (1988)
(suggesting that the government should proactively consider using eminent domain to
keep major employers from leaving the area and leaving unemployed workers
behind). But see Ilya Somin, Poletown Decision Did Not Create Desired Benefits, The
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can also create housing and public spaces, or alleviate traffic and
parking problems.'47 The increase in tax revenues fund public
education, housing, and other government services, on which local
residents, especially low-income residents, depend.148
The benefits of being able to exercise eminent domain to encourage
economic development can also come in less obvious forms. Some
environmentalists support the use of eminent domain for economic
development because such a power can give governments an
additional method of control over how land is used.'49 For example,
cities may choose to help private developers acquire previously
developed land for projects because building on that land is
environmentally preferable to building on currently undeveloped
land. 5' Thus, although privately owned economic development
projects result in private benefits to the owners, significant benefits
from the development flow to the public as well.
3. Deference to Legislative Determinations of Public Use Is
Appropriate Because the Political Process Is Sufficient to Safeguard
Private Property Rights
The political process, through which citizens and interest groups
lobby for their interests to be represented by their legislators, 5'
safeguards private property rights, so courts should defer to legislative
determinations of public use. Too much judicial intervention is not
warranted because property owners in the United States are an
influential class, and thus less in need of protection than commonly
argued.'52 In this view, landowners do not need special protection
through the Takings Clause.'53 Rather, they are able to use their
Detroit News, Aug. 8, 2004, at 13A (stating that the General Motors assembly plant
built following City of Detroit v. Poletown actually created only about half of the 6000
jobs that were originally anticipated, although over 4000 people were displaced).
147. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 509 (Conn.), cert. granted,
125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
148. See J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 How. L.J. 405, 418-19
(2003) (arguing that gentrification may not deserve the criticism it has received
because it can create economic, political, and social advantages for poor and ethnic
minorities and its negative consequences can be minimized).
149. See Pristin, supra note 1 (noting that the controversy over economic
development as a public use has produced some strange allies, including
environmental groups lining up with developers in favor of such uses of eminent
domain as encouraging "smart growth" rather than suburban sprawl).
150. See id.
151. See Jones, supra note 75, at 302.
152. See Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA
L. Rev. 77, 114-15 (1995) (suggesting that, since property owners have political clout,
society's evolving ideas of environmentalism would naturally transition towards
environmental goals without the need for government interference through the
Takings Clause). But see infra text accompanying notes 203-08 (arguing that property
owners lack the political voice to challenge uses of eminent domain).
153. See Freyfogle, supra note 152, at 114-15.
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political clout to "fend for themselves" against abuses of eminent
domain by lobbying for their interests and electing legislators who
represent those interests. 54
For this reason, one scholar has argued for primary reliance on the
political process instead of the courts, but in the context of regulatory
takings rather than physical takings under the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause.'55 Especially in state legislatures and Congress,
property owners are able to effectively organize and lobby for their
interests.15 6 Legislators are further constrained against abusing their
regulatory power by the knowledge that property owners may decline
to buy property in certain jurisdictions or at all if their use and
enjoyment of it is overregulated.157 Courts should take these checks
and balances into account when deciding whether to disrupt this
political process.'58 Judicial intervention is only needed when
property owners do not have a political voice or the option to vote
with their feet,'59 which is more likely in local legislative land use
decisions than higher-level ones. 6°  Thus, except in certain
circumstances when there is an increased risk that property owners do
not have an effective check on legislative decisions, courts should
refrain from interfering in the political process.1
6
'
Most courts that allow the use of eminent domain for economic
development are deferential to legislative determinations that the
economic development project in question serves a valid public use.'62
154. See id.
155. See William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics 5
(1995) (arguing that issues regarding regulatory takings should "be left to the political
branches of the state and federal governments" unless the political process is in some
way skewed against the landowner). Regulatory takings are government regulations
that diminish property value to such an extent that compensation might be required
under the Takings Clause. See id. at 1.
156. See id. at 4.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. That is, the option to move to a new locality with land use laws that they
prefer. See generally William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home
Values Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use
Policies (2001) (exploring how homeowners' concerns about their home values drives
local governments to compete to provide services to increase the value of this major
asset of their dominant political constituents).
160. See Fischel, supra note 155, at 5.
161. See id.
162. In federal and most state courts, whether an exercise of eminent domain
satisfies the public use requirement is initially a legislative question, but one that is
subject to review by the courts with varying deference. Compare Bailey v. Myers, 76
P.3d 898, 900 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that the question of "whether the
contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as such
without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public" (quoting Ariz. Const.
art. II, § 17)), and County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 785 (Mich. 2004)
(criticizing the court's deference to the legislature in Poletown and asserting that
questions regarding the public use requirement are "squarely within the Court's
authority"), with Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 523 (Conn.), cert.
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For example, in Kelo v. City of New London, the court, noting that
other state and federal courts do the same, gave "substantial
deference" to the legislative determination that the purpose of the
exercise of eminent domain satisfied the public use requirement.'63
Such deference is appropriate because "the legislature, not the
judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by
social legislation" and eminent domain is properly the subject of social
legislation. 6" Courts thus retain only a limited role in a public use
determination, by conducting rational basis review of the legislative
purpose for the exercise of eminent domain.' For most of these
courts, rational basis review is sufficient to allow the legislature to
take the primary role in regulating eminent domain decisions, but to
retain some authority for the judiciary to screen for potential abuses
of that power. 166
4. The Original Intent of the Words "Public Use" in the Takings
Clause Was Not to Limit the Use of Eminent Domain
Reliance on the political process to safeguard private property
rights is consistent with the original intent of the drafters of the Fifth
Amendment. 167  The words "public use" may never have been
intended to be an absolute limit on eminent domain power at all.
6
'
Rather, the words described when compensation was required-when
property taken by eminent domain is put to public use.' 69 The Takings
granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004) (pointing out that the court has long been deferential to
legislative public use determinations).
163. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 527-28.
164. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); see also Haw. Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) ("Judicial deference is required because, in our
system of government, legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes
should be advanced by an exercise of the taking power.").
165. See, e.g., Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241; Berman, 348 U.S. at 32; Kelo, 843 A.2d at
528; see also infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (pointing out that rational
basis review of eminent domain cases is consistent with substantive due process
treatment of economic legislation). Under rational basis review, a court will uphold a
law as long as it bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate government interest.
See Black's Law Dictionary 1290 (8th ed. 2004).
166. See supra text accompanying note 165. But cf. supra text accompanying notes
86-88 (purporting to apply a heightened standard of review while still showing great
deference to the legislature's determination of public use); infra notes 222-35 and
accompanying text (arguing that a heightened standard of review is necessary to
guard against abuses of eminent domain).
167. See Harrington, supra note 23, at 1299 (arguing that the original understanding
of "public use" was never to describe constitutionally permissible takings, but rather
to describe when compensation for takings was required).
168. See id.; Merrill, supra note 25, at 71 (noting that the words "public use" in the
Takings Clause are ambiguous and could describe either when the government may
exercise eminent domain or when the government must compensate an owner for
taking his property); supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
169. See supra note 168; see also Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 Yale L.J. 1077, 1079-80
(1993) (arguing that the phrase "public use" in the Takings Clause specifies when
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Clause thus construed, however, does not leave property owners
without any protection against abuses of eminent domain. 17 Instead
of using "public use" as a protection, Congress's "unstated assumption
[in drafting the Fifth Amendment] was simply that representative
government-subject to appropriate procedural requirements-would
be enough to protect against the abuses of the power of eminent
domain.' 171 Thus, the United States Constitution was never intended
to allow the courts to interfere significantly in legislative
determinations of when the use of eminent domain is appropriate.
5. There Are Protections Against Abuses of Eminent Domain Other
Than Eliminating Its Use for Economic Development
There are better ways to protect individuals against abuses of the
power of eminent domain than by categorically prohibiting its use for
economic development. 73  Some scholars have suggested increasing
protection against abuse by using other parts of the Takings Clause,
such as the just compensation requirement' 14 or procedural due
process, 75 instead of the public use requirement. 76 One common
objection to the use of eminent domain is that property owners may
place subjective value on their properties that is not taken into
account in determining the compensation due for a taking.7 7 Another
common objection when the property taken will ultimately be owned
compensation is required, not when takings are permissible, so the government
should only compensate property owners when it takes land and puts it to public use,
but not when land is taken but not so used).
170. See infra text accompanying note 171.
171. See Harrington, supra note 23, at 1299; see also Fischel, supra note 155, at 73
(describing the Takings Clause as containing mechanisms to protect against excessive
taking, including just compensation, and to facilitate change, by requiring that
property be surrendered, but not to absolutely prohibit certain takings, through the
words "public use").
172. See Harrington, supra note 23, at 1299.
173. See, e.g., Pefialver, supra note 108.
174. See supra text accompanying note 22 (quoting the Takings Clause of the
United States Constitution, including the just compensation requirement); supra note
25 (quoting various takings clauses of state constitutions).
175. The United States Constitution provides that neither the state nor the federal
government may deprive any person of property without due process of law. U.S.
Const. amends. V, XIV.
176. See Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public Abuse, 68 UMKC L. Rev. 49,
70-73 (1999) (suggesting the use of procedural due process and just compensation
requirements to remedy excessive uses of eminent domain, while allowing some uses
of eminent domain for economic development to continue); Merrill, supra note 25, at
84 (suggesting a change to the amount of compensation due for an exercise of
eminent domain to compensate for the full value that an owner attaches to his
property); Pefialver, supra note 108 (suggesting that the public use requirement
should not be narrowed too much and that other tools, including the just
compensation clause, can be used to ensure property owners are treated fairly).
177. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 25, at 83; Jones, supra note 75, at 297-98 (citing
examples of inadequate compensation for condemnation through eminent domain).
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by a private entity is that the private owner will personally profit from
his use of the property.'78 In other words, that owner gets to keep for
himself much of the surplus value of the property, which is the
difference in income between the new, often commercial, use of the
land and the old use by the original owner.'79 Currently, the minimum
compensation required by the United States Constitution for taking
property by eminent domain is the market value of the property,8 °
although some federal and state statutes require more.' While no
amount of money can totally compensate for the subjective value an
owner places on her property, a more generous compensation rule
makes up for some of these uncompensated losses and alleviates some
of the sense of unfairness of the taking.
82
Procedural and substantive due process also protect against abuses
of eminent domain. 83 Before the government deprives an individual
of an interest in property, such as through eminent domain, the
property owner is entitled to certain procedural protections.1"4 The
property owner must have a meaningful opportunity to be heard, 85
which requires, at a minimum, the "drafting and filing of a formal
judicial complaint and service of process on the owner." '86 This is
usually accompanied by an appraisal of the value of the property and
a hearing to determine whether the exercise of eminent domain is
legal and, if so, what the proper amount of compensation is.'87 When
such procedures are in place and effectively provide an owner facing
condemnation with a meaningful opportunity to inquire into the
government's purpose for the taking, there is less chance that the
178. See Merrill, supra note 25, at 85; see, e.g., supra text accompanying note 84.
179. See Merrill, supra note 25, at 85.
180. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Market value fails to compensate
for a variety of other costs of the takings, including the subjective value an owner
attaches to her property and relocation costs. See Ellickson & Been, supra note 25, at
1045-46.
181. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (2000) (requiring the federal government and
states seeking certain federal land development grants to pay condemnees reasonable
moving expenses and other bonus payments over the market value of the property).
Many states enacted similar statutes. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-56-101 to -113
(2003); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 8-266 to -282 (2001).
182. See Merrill, supra note 25, at 83-84; Pefialver, supra note 108.
183. See Lazzarotti, supra note 176, at 70-72 (discussing procedural due process
protections). But see Jones, supra note 75, at 306-07 (arguing that the current state of
substantive due process protection of economic rights, which provides for rational
basis review, is inadequate).
184. See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33
(1976) (stating that an individual may not be deprived of a property interest without
some form of a hearing).
185. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 333.
186. Merrill, supra note 25, at 77.
187. See id. But see Lazzarotti, supra note 176, at 71 (noting that there is no
uniform, constitutionally required procedure due for the exercise of eminent domain).
Cf. Mansnerus, supra note 30, at 435 (describing "quick-take" statutes in effect in
some jurisdictions, which allow eminent domain procedures to be expedited).
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exercise of eminent domain is unconstitutional. 8 Furthermore, when
the government exercising eminent domain must pay for
compensation to the property owner and for these procedural due
process requirements, it has an incentive to limit excessive uses of
eminent domain.'89 Thus, increasing compensation and procedural
due process requirements for eminent domain can provide effective
limits on abuses of eminent domain without totally limiting its utility
for valid economic development projects. 90
Substantive due process, which concerns the purpose for the
legislation and the means through which those purposes are
accomplished, also offers protection against abuses of eminent domain
by requiring rational basis review 9' of economic legislation.
9 2
Although substantive due process protection of economic rights has
been greatly weakened in the post-Lochner era,'93 rational basis
review still requires courts to ensure that there is a legitimate purpose
for the exercise of eminent domain and that eminent domain is a
reasonable method through which to achieve that purpose.194
B. The Narrow Interpretation: Economic Development Does Not
Satisfy the Public Use Requirement
Part II.B discusses the reasons some courts and scholars do not view
economic development as a valid public use for the exercise of
eminent domain.
188. See Lazzarotti, supra note 176, at 68, 70-72.
189. See Fischel, supra note 155, at 74 (opining that deference to legislative
determinations of public use is permissible because the costs of exercising eminent
domain deter legislatures from unrestrained uses of eminent domain); cf. Merrill,
supra note 25, at 77-78, 80-81, 87-88 (supporting the idea that, in general, the costs of
exercising eminent domain are a sufficient check on abuses of eminent domain, but
asserting that these checks may break down in economic development cases); infra
text accompanying notes 227-35.
190. See Lazzarotti, supra note 176, at 68; supra text accompanying notes 174-89.
191. See supra note 165.
192. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)
(holding that economic legislation "is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in
the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis").
193. The Supreme Court first expanded substantive due process protection of
economic rights in Lochner v. New York, in which the Court reviewed economic
legislation regarding the minimum wage with heightened scrutiny. 198 U.S. 45, 64
(1905). By 1937, however, the Court abandoned heightened substantive due process
review of economic legislation and showed more deference to legislative regulation of
business, economic, and social affairs by applying a rational basis standard of review
to such legislation. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 (upholding, under rational
basis review, a congressional act prohibiting the shipment of filled milk through
interstate commerce); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-99 (1937)
(upholding a regulation of minimum wage for women because the regulation was
reasonable in relation to its subject and was adopted in the interests of the
community).
194. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
2005] BREAKING NEW GROUND 1861
1. The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development Does
Not Sufficiently Safeguard Private Property Rights
The primary criticism of allowing economic development as a valid
public use is that private property rights are not sufficiently
protected. 195  Property owners view their constitutionally protected
property rights196 as "historical and sacred." 197  In addition, people
tend to overvalue what they currently own and undervalue
opportunity losses, for example, compensation they would receive in
return for giving up property they currently own and future benefits
they would receive as a result of economic development.' 98 Given this
viewpoint of property rights, property owners tend to resist any
government interference in their property. 99 Thus, when eminent
domain is used to transfer property from one private owner to
another, it often seems unfair"° and as though the government is
favoring one private owner at the expense of another."0' Predictably,
when such a use of eminent domain occurs, public outcry often
ensues.
202
Individual property owners may not be in a position to effectively
challenge government takings of their property through the political
process.0 3 In the political process, homeowners facing condemnation
195. See Lazzarotti, supra note 176, at 74 (exploring whether eminent domain can
be used for economic development in a manner that maintains the importance of
private property rights); Jones, supra note 75, at 287 ("[T]he definition of public use
[has been expanded] to the extent that the Fifth Amendment no longer acts as a
viable safeguard of private property rights."); Kruckeberg, supra note 27, at 543
("Whether you know it or not, your house is for sale."); id. at 566 ("[C]orporations
may soon strip the significance from the concept of private property.").
196. The United States Constitution specifically protects against the deprivation of
"life, liberty, or property." U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.
197. Lazzarotti, supra note 176, at 54.
198. See Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 285,
300 (1990) (offering a psychological explanation for why people are reluctant to give
up property even if they will be compensated for it).
199. See id.
200. See, e.g., Mansnerus, supra note 30, at 440 ("[F]orcing an owner to transfer his
property to another owner in the name of better planning may violate a fundamental
notion of fairness .... "); Pehialver, supra note 108 ("Non-lawyers are often shocked
to learn that the state can exercise its power of eminent domain to facilitate ostensibly
private projects.").
201. See Madigan, supra note 27, at 193 (describing the use of eminent domain to
transfer property from one private owner to another as favoring one private interest
over another and arguing that such use is economically inefficient).
202. See Tresa Baldas, Taking Aim at Eminent Domain, Nat'l L.J., July 19, 2004, at
1 (reporting that homeowners are worried that they could be the next victims of
"widespread abuse of eminent domain by municipalities"); Bullock, supra note 108
(arguing that the public use requirement should be narrowed to stop the abusive use
of eminent domain to transfer property from one private owner to another, as for
economic development).
203. See Lazzarotti, supra note 176, at 73-74; Jones, supra note 75, at 302;
Mansnerus, supra note 30, at 436. But see supra text accompanying notes 152-57
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may encounter several barriers to an effective challenge. 2°4 Property
owners may individually lack the political clout to influence legislative
public use decisions.2°" They may also be unable to organize into
larger groups against condemnations because of "the transient nature
of the condemnation and the condemnee's veritable isolation. 2 6 A
lack of interest or faith in the political process is a further barrier to
organization. 27  Even if property owners were able to organize a
challenge to the taking of their property to make way for a large
corporation, individual property owners cannot compete with the
legislative influence of large corporations.2 8
Consequently, some argue that when property changes hands from
one private owner to another, the government should not intervene at
all if possible.2 9 The concern is that government intervention "upsets
the balance, efficiency, and success of [free] markets., 2'0 The transfer
of property ownership through market transactions is thus preferred
to transfer through eminent domain.2 '
2. The Private Benefits of Economic Development Outweigh Any
Public Benefit
Many courts that reject economic development as a valid public use
do so by finding that the benefits to the ultimate private owner greatly
outweigh any anticipated public benefits. For instance, in Bailey v.
Myers, the court rejected the city's argument that the use of eminent
domain to build a retail center served a valid public use because the
project would revitalize the downtown area, increase property tax
revenues, and create new jobs.21 3 Instead, the court found that the
(arguing that property owners have sufficient political clout to challenge uses of
eminent domain through the political process).
204. See Lazzarotti, supra note 176, at 73-74; Jones, supra note 75, at 302.
205. See Mansnerus, supra note 30, at 436.
206. Jones, supra note 75, at 302.
207. See Lazzarotti, supra note 176, at 73-74.
208. See id.; Levmore, supra note 198, at 300-01 (noting that politicians have
incentives to generate windfalls for some of their constituents even at the expense of
others).
209. See Madigan, supra note 27, at 192.
210. See id.
211. See id.; cf infra text accompanying notes 228-31 (pointing out that the
government may prefer the use of market transactions over eminent domain to
acquire land).
212. See, e.g., Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898, 904 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Baycol, Inc.
v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451, 456-59 (Fla. 1975) (holding that the city
could not condemn land through eminent domain to build a parking lot below a
privately owned shopping mall because the basis for the need was private interest, not
public necessity); Merrill v. City of Manchester, 499 A.2d 216, 218 (N.H. 1985)
(holding the public use requirement of the New Hampshire Constitution was not
satisfied where the city sought to use eminent domain to develop land into an
industrial park because such a use would only incidentally benefit the public).
213. Bailey, 76 P.3d at 901.
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private owners of the stores, restaurants, and office space would be
the primary beneficiaries of the taking through the profits they would
generate. 14 These private benefits outweighed any public benefits
such as tax revenues and new jobs. 15 Therefore, no use of eminent
domain to transfer property to a private party that stands to profit
from the development satisfies the public use requirement. 16
3. The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development Is
Contrary to Original Intent
Adherence to the original understanding of the power of eminent
domain of the drafters of the Takings Clause supports a narrow
interpretation of the public use requirement.21 7  The drafters and
ratifiers of the Fifth Amendment would not have understood it to
support the use of eminent domain to transfer property to a private
party for any reason.218 The same may be true of state constitutions
even though, in many cases, they were written and ratified more
recently than the United States Constitution."9 For example, the
court in County of Wayne v. Hathcock relied on the understanding of
the public use requirement of the Michigan Constitution at the time of
its ratification in 1963 to hold that economic development did not
satisfy the public use requirement. 20 Thus, under either the Federal
Constitution or certain state constitutions, the use of eminent domain
for economic development is contrary to the original understanding of
those constitutions.221
4. The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development Requires
Heightened Judicial Scrutiny
The use of eminent domain for economic development requires
heightened scrutiny to ensure that the taking is truly necessary and for
214. Id. at 904.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See infra text accompanying notes 218-20.
218. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (seriatim opinion) ("It is
against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with [the power to
take property from A and give it to B] and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they
have done it."). But see supra text accompanying notes 168-71. A counterargument to
an originalist approach is that the concept of public use is one that changes over time.
See Gen. Bldg. Contractors v. Bd. of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 66 P.3d 873, 882
(Kan. 2003) ("[T]here is no precise definition of what constitutes a public use, and
what may be considered a valid public use or purpose changes over time." (quoting
State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County/Kan. City, 962 P.2d 543,
553 (Kan. 1998))); Mansnerus, supra note 30, at 410; supra text accompanying note 98.
219. For example, the Michigan Constitution relied on in County of Wayne v.
Hathcock was ratified in 1963. 684 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Mich. 2004).
220. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 218-20.
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a public purpose.222 At the most extreme, courts might review public
use decisions with strict scrutiny, 3 in which the courts would never
presume the constitutionality of a taking simply because the
legislature has found it to be constitutional.224  Other scholars
skeptical of judicial deference to legislative public use decisions would
require some level of heightened scrutiny, although not always strict
scrutiny.2 5 Regardless of what this level of scrutiny would be called, it
would entail a searching, objective review by the court of "the 'public'
nature of the transaction," rather than deference to legislative
determinations.226
Some scholars would require heightened scrutiny of economic
development public use decisions even when, in other public use
cases, legislative deference is appropriate. 27 One economic model of
eminent domain posits that, in general, "courts should give virtually
complete deference to legislative determinations of public use"
because governments seeking to conserve costs will self-regulate
222. See Merrill, supra note 25, at 87-88; Ralph Nader & Allen Hirsch, Making
Eminent Domain Humane, 49 Vill. L. Rev. 207, 224 (2004) (arguing for heightened
scrutiny of uses of eminent domain to transfer property from one private party to
another); Jones, supra note 75, at 305-07 (arguing that property rights are
fundamental rights and, as such, deserve strict scrutiny by the courts); Mansnerus,
supra note 30, at 444; Jonathan Neal Portner, Comment, The Continued Expansion of
the Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 17 U. Bait. L. Rev. 542, 557 (1988)
(concluding that courts need to apply stricter scrutiny to cases involving the transfer
of property from one private party to another through eminent domain in order to
adequately protect property rights). For the most part, courts use rational basis
review in eminent domain cases. See Jennifer Maude Klemetsrud, Note, The Use of
Eminent Domain for Economic Development, 75 N.D. L. Rev. 783, 802 (1999)
(analyzing various standards of review used by courts to decide public use cases). But
cf Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459-60 (Mich.
1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004)
(stating that the court would review with "heightened scrutiny" exercises of eminent
domain in which private entities are benefited, but also showing great deference to
the legislature's public use determination).
223. See Nader & Hirsch, supra note 222, at 224 (proposing strict scrutiny of
eminent domain takings when the property will be given to a private party, the
condemnee has a particularly strong interest in the property for which money cannot
completely compensate, and the condemnee has little political power); Jones, supra
note 75, at 305-06 (arguing that property rights are fundamental rights and should
thus receive strict scrutiny). The strict scrutiny standard of review requires the
government to show that there is a compelling government interest that justifies and
necessitates the legislative decision in question. See Black's Law Dictionary 1462 (8th
ed. 2004); cf supra note 165 (defining rational basis review).
224. See Jones, supra note 75, at 301.
225. See Nader & Hirsch, supra note 222, at 224 (arguing for heightened scrutiny
when eminent domain is used to transfer property from one private party to another
and strict scrutiny when additional criteria is met); Mansnerus, supra note 30, at 444-
55 (arguing for a searching, objective rational review of eminent domain where the
property taken will be transferred to private ownership).
226. Mansnerus, supra note 30, at 449; see also Nader & Hirsch, supra note 222, at
225 (proposing that heightened review should require the exercise of eminent domain
to be "substantially connected to an important government purpose").
227. See Merrill, supra note 25, at 80-87.
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against abuse.228 In a normal market situation, the costs of exercising
eminent domain, including the costs of service of process on the
landowner, appraisal of the property, and the possibility of challenge,
make the acquisition of land through purchase cheaper and thus
preferable.229 The government will only seek to use eminent domain
when market costs are artificially high due to a breakdown in the
market, such as a holdout situation.230 Thus, the costs of exercising
eminent domain compared to the costs of a normal purchase of
property ensure that the risks of abuse of the power of eminent
domain are low. 231
In the economic development situation, however, the exercise of
eminent domain is likely to generate a surplus value that profits only
the ultimate owner of the property, not the original owner.232 If the
surplus is greater than the costs of eminent domain, the private entity
that will capture the surplus has an incentive to convince the
government to exercise eminent domain on its behalf, even if
normally, the government would not.233 The model would thus
require courts to scrutinize closely the decision to use eminent domain
when "one or a small number of persons will capture a taking's
surplus.,234  Therefore, even if legislative deference is normally
appropriate for eminent domain decisions, the use of eminent domain
for economic development might require closer judicial scrutiny.235
Part III argues why a broad approach to public use that allows
economic development to satisfy the public use requirement is
preferable to narrowing public use and why the public use
determination should be made primarily by the legislature.
III. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS A VALID PUBLIC USE AND THE
POLITICAL PROCESS CONTAINS ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST
ABUSES OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Economic Development Is a Valid Public Use
Economic development is a valid public use for the exercise of
eminent domain because it creates real benefits for the community,
228. Id. at 81.
229. See id. at 77-78 (noting the costs of exercising eminent domain, including, at a
minimum, "drafting and filing a formal judicial complaint and service of process on
the owner"). But see Pefialver, supra note 108 ("Eminent domain is an important
power that allows the state to assemble large parcels of property without engaging in
an expensive series of consensual market transactions.").
230. See Merrill, supra note 25, at 77-78; supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
231. See Merrill, supra note 25, at 80-81.
232. See id. at 85, 87-88; supra text accompanying notes 178-79.
233. See Merrill, supra note 25, at 87-88; supra text accompanying notes 229-30.
234. Merrill, supra note 25, at 87.
235. See id. at 81, 87.
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such as increased job opportunities and tax revenues.236 In Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit2 37 and Kelo v. City of New
London,2 38 the cities seeking to use eminent domain for economic
development demonstrated the necessity for such development.239
Detroit was facing the loss of a major employer in the city at a time
when unemployment was already at eighteen percent overall.240
Although in Kelo the situation is not quite as dire, the city of New
London has recently lost thousands of jobs and is one of Connecticut's
poorest cities.24' Both cities studied the proposed projects and
determined that they would bring thousands of temporary and
permanent jobs and millions of dollars of tax revenues to the areas.242
Obviously, tax revenues can be used to fund a variety of government
services, including education and low-income housing.2 43 Thus, the
development projects proposed in these cases alleviate legitimate
problems facing the cities.
These development projects, along with their benefits to the
community, could not be realized without the option for the
government to use eminent domain to assemble large parcels of
land.2" Large-scale development projects often require the assembly
of large parcels of land under separate ownership. 245 Because of the
costs of negotiating with each landowner, eminent domain can
provide a less expensive way to acquire many separately owned
properties.246 Eminent domain also alleviates the problem of the
holdout landowners,247 which is most acute when developers need to
assemble many parcels of land for one project because the parcels are
less fungible. In this situation, sellers know that the developer does
236. See supra Part II.A.2.
237. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
238. 843 A.2d 500 (Conn.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3 (describing the City of New London's
need for economic development); supra notes 77-79, 81 and accompanying text
(describing Detroit's need to retain jobs when faced with the prospect of losing
General Motors as an employer).
240. See supra text accompanying note 82.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
242. See supra notes 81, 93 and accompanying text. Although the decision in
Poletown has been criticized because the plant did not actually generate as many jobs
as the city had originally hoped, the plant still created thousands of jobs. See supra
note 146.
243. See supra text accompanying note 148.
244. See supra Part II.A.1.
245. See supra note 72.
246. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44 (describing the problem of holdout
landowners who resist selling at reasonable prices, causing development projects to
become prohibitively expensive or impeding the projects altogether). Holdouts might
account for the fact that the most common public use controversy involves the
assembly of large parcels of land. See supra note 72.
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not have other options.248 The seller is in a position to holdout for a
higher selling price than if the developers could easily substitute other
parcels of land for the seller's parcel. The use of eminent domain is
thus often the only way that such projects can be completed cost-
effectively.249
Of course, while the use of eminent domain for economic
development projects is sometimes a necessity, that does not mean
that eminent domain should be a first recourse. People tend to view
the exercise of eminent domain as an abuse of power when the
government interferes with normal market transactions between
private parties. 250 To that end, courts might inquire whether private
entities seeking to purchase land have attempted to do so in good
faith through normal market methods, including using straw
transactions or buying agents, before seeking legislative help through
eminent domain. In addition, the legislature exercising eminent
domain might take steps to ensure that the transaction approximates a
market transaction as much as possible. For example, although the
Hawaii legislature, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,2 2 helped
private owners to purchase land from other private owners through
eminent domain, it enacted a complicated set of prerequisites to a
sale, including requiring negotiations between the "buyer" and the
''seller" to set a mutually agreeable price as though they were
negotiating a normal sale.253 These prerequisites help to ensure that
property owners are not the victims of needless condemnations by
eminent domain. The political process and judicial review further
protect property owners from government abuse of the eminent
domain power. 4
B. The Legislature Is the Primary Place to Determine Public Use
In our system of government, the legislature is charged with the
power and responsibility to regulate health, safety, and welfare, which
includes the power to make land use decisions.255 The legislature is
the appropriate branch of government to make public use decisions
because landowners have more recourse to express dissatisfaction
with their elected representatives than with the judiciary. Arguably,
the drafters of the Fifth Amendment originally intended to protect
property rights through the political process rather than the public use
248. See supra text accompanying note 141.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 200-02, 210-11.
251. Cf supra note 144.
252. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
253. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
254. See infra text accompanying notes 255-88.
255. See supra text accompanying note 164.
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requirement.25 6 When landowners are unhappy with the land use
decisions being made by the legislature on their behalf, they are free
to elect new representatives257 or to vote with their feet by moving to a
new locality with land use laws that they prefer.258 This is consistent
with the most basic understanding of our nation's governing branches,
and applicable to all types of legislation, not just legislation
concerning eminent domain.
Furthermore, landowners are influential in the political process.259
They have the power to lobby for their interests2 6° and to elect
representatives who will represent those interests. Although some
commentators fear that property owners do not have the full benefits
of the political process because they are unable to organize effectively
to challenge condemnations,26' this is not the case in most public use
cases, which involve the assembly of large parcels of land. 62 In
assembly cases, there are usually at least several property owners who
stand to be displaced by the proposed development projects. In
addition, these property owners own land near each other, which
facilitates the identification and contact of other owners faced with
the same government action. These owners are able to organize to
challenge government exercises of eminent domain. For example, all
the property owners who refused to sell their land to the developer in
Kelo brought suit together against the city.2 63 Likewise, residents
facing condemnation in Poletown joined with a local, voluntary
neighborhood association, the Poletown Neighborhood Council, to
challenge the city's proposed project.2" In Poletown, thousands of
people were displaced by the use of eminent domain.2 65 Legislators
who made the condemnation decision must have been cognizant of
the fact that they were displacing so many of their constituents, even if
they determined nonetheless that the decision was best for the area as
a whole. Thus, in the most common public use cases, involving
256. See supra Part II.A.4. But cf. supra text accompanying note 218 (arguing that
an original understanding of the Fifth Amendment would not allow the use of
eminent domain for economic development).
257. Landowners who cannot vote in a jurisdiction in which they own property, for
example, because they are domiciliaries of another state, purchased their property on
notice that they would not have legislative recourse to express their dissatisfaction
with land use decisions made by the legislature in that state.
258. See supra text accompanying note 157; supra note 159.
259. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
260. See supra text accompanying note 156.
261. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
263. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507, 511 (Conn.), cert. granted,
125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
264. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457
(Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich.
2004).
265. See supra note 146.
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assembly of land, property owners do have recourse in the political
process.
Even if the people displaced by development projects are not
landowners, they are still residents of the area and able to voice their
approval or disapproval by voting for legislators that will represent
their opinions. In fact, when considering resident non-property
owners, the legislature is their primary recourse if they are dissatisfied
with the use of eminent domain powers. These residents are unlikely
to appeal to the courts either because they do not have standing to
challenge the taking, or because they probably stand to lose very little
of market value. 66
Finally, when property owners are truly unable to use the political
process to oppose legislative land use decisions, they may turn to the
courts for relief. To assure that these owners have the resources to
file suit in court, perhaps prevailing plaintiffs should be awarded
attorney's fees. 67 This way, all owners have some channel through
which to challenge eminent domain decisions.
C. Just Compensation and Due Process Are Better Ways to Protect
Against Abuses than by Totally Eliminating Economic Development
As a Valid Public Use
Just compensation2 68 and due process26 9 can also be used to ensure
that property owners are not victims of an abuse of the power of
eminent domain, without categorically prohibiting the government's
ability to use eminent domain for worthy economic development
projects. The constitutionally required measure of compensation
awarded for a taking of property by eminent domain, usually market
value of the property,270 is inadequate. Market value does not cover a
condemnee's other costs incurred as a result of the taking, such as
relocation costs or value placed on homes above market value.271' Nor
does it cover the costs of attorney's fees to challenge eminent domain
in court.2 72 Money cannot always completely compensate for the
value that a property owner attaches to her home, but increasing
required compensation above the market value of the property can
266. If the residents own a leasehold, the government must compensate them at
least for taking the market value of that property interest, see supra note 14, an
amount unlikely to make the costs of litigation worthwhile in many cases. If residents
do not own a leasehold, they have no marketable property interest. Therefore, if just
compensation is only the market value of the property interest held, these residents
stand to recover nothing from the exercise of eminent domain.
267. See infra Part III.C.
268. See supra text accompanying note 22; supra note 25.
269. See supra note 175.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 180-81.
271. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
272. See supra text accompanying note 267 (suggesting the award of attorney's fees
to prevailing challengers of eminent domain).
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greatly alleviate the sense of unfairness that a few citizens must bear
more than their proportional share to benefit the whole community.273
The procedural safeguards already in place can also go a long way
towards protecting owners from eminent domain abuses. 74 At a
minimum, due process requires the service of process before an owner
is subjected to eminent domain."5 In addition, the exercise of eminent
domain often requires an appraisal of the property and a hearing on
the legality of, and compensation for, the taking before the property
transfer takes place. 76 These procedural due process requirements
are onerous and costly for the government.277 Thus, the procedures
ensure that eminent domain is only used when necessary and that the
owner facing condemnation is afforded time and a forum in which to
challenge the taking.7 '
Finally, property owners receive protection against abuses of
eminent domain through substantive due process. 79 Substantive due
process mandates rational basis review of economic legislation such as
economic development eminent domain decisions.28
D. Rational Basis Judicial Review of Legislative Determinations of
Public Use Is Sufficient
Even though the legislature is best suited to make eminent domain
decisions, courts maintain an essential role in reviewing such
determinations. Courts conducting a sincere rational basis review
must ensure that the government has a legitimate purpose for the
action and that the action is rationally related to that purpose.28
Rational basis review is the standard that courts use most when
reviewing challenged legislation and not all legislation passes rational
review. 282 Strict or heightened scrutiny of every eminent domain
273. See supra text accompanying note 182. Monetary compensation for a taking
through eminent domain should include: market value of the property; additional
value not included in market value that an owner attaches to the property, for
example, value accrued to the owner by virtue of having put the property to special
use, but determined objectively; moving and relocation expenses; compensation for
the time spent on, and disruption of, the relocation; attorney's fees for an owner that
prevails on a constitutional challenge of the exercise of eminent domain; and possibly
an additional bonus payment to cover other uncompensated subjective losses.
Nonmonetary compensation should include relocation assistance, including help
finding a new home or property that is comparable in size, amenities, and
convenience to the condemned property.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 183-90.
275. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
279. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 191-92; infra Part III.D (explaining why
rational basis review sufficiently protects against abuses of eminent domain).
281. See supra note 165.
282. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 284-88.
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challenge283 is inappropriate because there is no reason to believe that
legislative decisions involving economic development are more likely
to be suspect than other legislative decisions that receive rational basis
review. Requiring heightened scrutiny would needlessly burden
courts when rational basis review is sufficient to protect landowners
from government abuse of the power of eminent domain.
Rational basis review does not mean that every proposed use of
eminent domain will satisfy the public use requirement. In Casino
Reinvestment Development Authority v. Banin,2 4 using rational basis
review, the court did not allow the government to use eminent domain
to transfer property to a casino owned by Donald Trump because
there was no definite plan as to the proposed use of the land.285
Likewise, in 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment
Agency,286 the court found that a proposed use of eminent domain for
economic development was invalid because the reason the
government advanced for the taking was purely to satisfy the private
expansion plans of a major retailer in the city and thus not for a public
purpose.287 Therefore, courts do not abdicate their role by applying
rational basis review to public use cases, even if economic
development can sometimes satisfy the public use requirement.2 8
A broad reading of the public use requirement in the United States
Constitution allows state and local governments the latitude to tailor
their own public use requirements to the needs of their residents. For
example, if the Supreme Court upholds the broad reading of the
public use requirement in the United States Constitution in Kelo v.
City of New London,28 9 narrow state interpretations of public use,
such as that espoused in County of Wayne v. Hathcock,291 will stand.
On the other hand, if the Court narrows the federal public use
requirement too much, all governments will lose the option of using
eminent domain to benefit their constituents291 or to adapt to changing
ideas of public use.292
283. See supra Part II.B.4.
284. 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 110-15.
286. 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
287. See supra note 107.
288. But see supra text accompanying notes 222-26. Even after the court's broad
reading of public use in Poletown, which was so widely criticized as rendering the
public use requirement a nullity, see supra notes 75, 90 and accompanying text,
Michigan courts still found that some uses of eminent domain to transfer property to
a private party did not satisfy the public use requirement, see supra note 90. Michigan
courts after Poletown, however, purported to use heightened scrutiny where the use
of eminent domain would result in private benefits. See supra text accompanying
notes 86-88; supra note 222.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 97-104.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 127-31.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 145-50, 236-43.
292. See supra note 218.
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E. The Development Project in Kelo v. City of New London Satisfies
the Public Use Requirement
Under the standards articulated above, the waterfront development
project proposed by the City of New London in Kelo is a valid public
use for the exercise of eminent domain. The city has demonstrated
that New London will benefit greatly from the development.293 The
project will greatly increase the number of jobs available in the area as
well as tax revenues to the city. 94 The development will also rebuild
and rejuvenate the New London waterfront, which for the past few
years has largely sat vacant.295
Furthermore, the use of eminent domain is necessary for the
completion of this project. The owners who have challenged the
condemnation have unconditionally refused to sell,296 even after all
other property owners in the area have settled with the city and
vacated the premises.2 97 Because their properties are integral to the
project, the whole project is on hold unless their parcels can be
acquired through eminent domain.
The legislative decision to exercise eminent domain satisfies
rational basis review. As the Supreme Court of Connecticut has
verified, the city is in need of development because of its recent job
losses and because of its status as one of the poorest cities in the
state.2 98 The city has determined that the project is a significant step
towards alleviating these problems, because it will directly create jobs
and tax revenues,2 99 as the recent Pfizer development created.3" Thus,
the project is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose
and should be allowed to proceed, although the Supreme Court
should take care to ensure that the plaintiffs are adequately
compensated for the taking.
CONCLUSION
Given the increase in suburban sprawl and the scarcity of land in
more dense areas, governments seeking to encourage economic
development in certain areas need to be able to use eminent domain
to assemble land for the projects. 01 These projects can serve a valid
public use depending on the needs of the community, in the form of
tax revenues, job creation, or control over how land is developed.302
293. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8, 93-95.
294. See supra text accompanying note 93.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 4, 7-8.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
297. See supra note 12.
298. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
300. See supra note 6.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 244-49.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 236-43.
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Property owners are not at great risk of being victims of abuse of
eminent domain because of the voice they have in the legislature to
challenge land use decisions with which they disagree.3"3 Indeed, the
legislature is the proper forum in which to first challenge the use of
eminent domain."° If this process fails for any reason, the courts are
available to determine whether the decision of the legislatures has a
legitimate purpose and whether the project is a rational way to
achieve that purpose.0 5 In addition, the legislature can adjust the
level of compensation or increase due process requirements to ensure
that property owners are sufficiently protected against abuse. 0 6 Thus,
property owners are adequately protected by the political process and
judicial review. Property owners should not be protected by
narrowing the public use requirement so much that eminent domain
can never be used for economic development projects because then
many of these projects could not be completed, nor any of their
benefits to the community realized.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 259-66.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 255-66.
305. See supra Parts III.B, III.D.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 268-80.
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